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TESTING THE WATERS: USING COLLECTIVE
REAL OPTIONS TO MANAGE THE SOCIAL
DILEMMA OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
MATTHEW W. MCCARTER
Chapman University
JOSEPH T. MAHONEY
GREGORY B. NORTHCRAFT
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
We extend real options research by introducing the concept of collective real options
and model how collective real options provide strategic alliances a mechanism to
manage social uncertainty. Collective real options manage social uncertainty by
producing relational small wins that develop trust. The amount of trust developed by
acquiring a collective real option depends on the exposure of alliance partners.
Alliance partner reputation also plays an important role in the impact of collective
real options.

from a lack of information about the intentions
of alliance partners, and it impedes interfirm
cooperation because alliance partners may fear
they cannot trust each other to do what is best
for the alliance (Messick, Allison, & Samuelson,
1988; Park & Ungson, 2001). This lack of trust
pushes alliance partners to either underinvest
defensively or not enter into the alliance altogether, thereby missing opportunities to capitalize fully on alliance potential (McCarter & Northcraft, 2007).
For the past two decades, real options research on uncertainty in alliance governance
(Kogut, 1991) has focused on understanding how
alliance partners use real options unilaterally to
manage environmental uncertainty (Folta, 1998;
Reuer & Tong, 2005). We develop a model of how
real options can be used collectively to manage
social uncertainty among alliance partners,
thereby enhancing the likelihood of alliance
success. The core logic of our model comes in
five parts: (1) large-scale alliance cooperation
represents a social dilemma requiring trust, (2)
collective real options offer alliance partners
the opportunity to achieve relational small wins
that increase trust, (3) increased trust decreases
the perceived vulnerability among alliance
partners and, thus, fuels larger-scale alliance
cooperation, (4) exposure (the amount of resources put at risk by alliance partners to acquire the collective real option) moderates the
effect of a relational small win on trust develop-

Strategic alliances are “voluntary arrangements [among two or more organizations] involving the exchange, sharing, or co-development of products, technologies, or services”
(Gulati, 1998: 293) and are a means for organizations to achieve goals they could not attain independently. Alliances create value through the
pooling of resources to provide alliance partners
with competitive advantages over rivals (Das &
Teng, 2000; Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 2003).
However, alliances often fail to create their anticipated benefits (Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007;
Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). This article examines
how the use of real options can influence the
likelihood of alliance success.
Two critical factors influencing alliance success are environmental uncertainty and social
uncertainty. Environmental uncertainty stems
from a lack of information about the market and
task environment (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Das &
Teng, 1996). As a consequence of environmental
uncertainty, alliance partners may fear that
their pooled investments will not yield a sufficiently profitable return (McCarter, Rockmann,
& Northcraft, 2010), and they may therefore protect their own interests at the expense of the
alliance (Luo, 2007). Social uncertainty stems

We express our appreciation to associate editor Jean
Philippe-Bonardi and three anonymous reviewers for their
input and suggestions.
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ment, and (5) the reputations of alliance partners
also play an important role in the impact of
collective real options.
Examining how collective real options influence social uncertainty in alliances helps
bridge the (often independently studied) structural and motivational approaches to alliance
governance. In doing so our conceptualization of
real options highlights the importance of social
uncertainty—and its management via the psychology of relational small wins—to alliance
success.
We begin by first reviewing essential elements of the social dilemma paradigm. Next, we
introduce the concept of collective real options
as a hybrid approach to managing social uncertainty in alliances. We then propose a model
capturing how collective real options influence
trust formation in alliances. We conclude by discussing the theoretical and managerial implications of our model.
STRATEGIC ALLIANCE SOCIAL DILEMMAS:
A BRIEF REVIEW
The social dilemma paradigm has proven
very useful in helping understand how social
uncertainty influences cooperation among alliance partners (Zeng & Chen, 2003). A social dilemma, broadly defined, is a situation in which
it appears that being uncooperative can be personally beneficial at the collective’s expense—
unless everyone else in the collective also
chooses to be uncooperative, in which case no
one benefits (Liebrand, 1983). In strategic alliances partners’ resources can be pooled to create a public good—that is, a resource that, once
produced, is enjoyed by all alliance partners,
whether they contributed or not (Olson, 1965).
For instance, a group of firms may pool resources to identify more efficient recycling processes (Tirole, 1996).1 When an alliance partner
1

Public goods come in two forms (Cornes & Sandler, 1996).
Pure public goods are resources available to anyone in a
society or similar large-scale collective—for example, a nation, community, or city. Examples of pure public goods
include public radio, national defense, and lighthouses. Private public goods (or club goods) are resources available to
anyone within a smaller-scale collective, such as a strategic
alliance. Examples of private public goods include new
technologies and processes developed in strategic alliances
and generic advertising campaigns (e.g., “Got milk?” and
“Beef, it’s what for dinner!”) used in a particular industry. In
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contributes private resources to further the alliance’s interest—such as contributing people or
capital to identify more efficient recycling processes—this action is termed cooperation
(Dawes, 1980). Defection occurs when an alliance partner fails to contribute (or underinvests)
private resources toward alliance initiatives
(Dawes, 1980).
An alliance partner might underinvest in alliance initiatives for two reasons. First, an alliance partner may attempt to “free ride”— enjoy
the created public good (e.g., more efficient recycling processes) without contributing toward
its creation. In other words, offensive defection
occurs when an alliance partner attempts to enjoy the shared benefit without incurring much (if
any) cost (Zeng & Chen, 2003). Alternatively, an
alliance partner may defensively defect—
underinvest or, in the extreme, not contribute at
all—to avoid wasting resources if the alliance
partner believes others also will underinvest
(Rockmann & Northcraft, 2008). Unfortunately, if
enough alliance partners underinvest, regardless of whether offensively or defensively, the
public good is not produced and no alliance
partners benefit—for example, poor air quality
abounds and alliance resources are wasted
(Messick & Brewer, 1983). We focus on defensive
defection here because even if measures are
taken to make offensive defection impossible,
an alliance partner may remain suspicious of
other alliance partners’ intentions and thereby
defect defensively to avoid wasting personal resources (McCarter & Northcraft, 2007).2

this second instance the private public good is public to a
smaller specified collective (e.g., alliance partners) while
being privatized from a larger specified collective (e.g., the
entire populace of a city). While our propositions are not
limited to either form of public good, in this article we refer
to examples of private public goods, and we use the abbreviated term public good to remain consistent with the types
of public goods discussed in the literature on strategic alliances (Agarwal, Croson, & Mahoney, 2010; McCarter &
Northcraft, 2007; Zeng & Chen, 2003).
2
The social dilemma paradigm is complementary to other
game-theoretic–based paradigms, such as co-opetition and
integrative negotiation. The similarity between the social
dilemma paradigm and other game-theoretic paradigms is
that value creation occurs through cooperative, collective
action. The difference resides in the degree of exclusivity
between cooperative and competitive actions. In social dilemmas cooperation and defection are interdependent: an
alliance partner cannot defect (or cooperate) without affecting the other alliance partners in negative (or positive) ways
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Structural and Motivational Approaches to
Strategic Alliance Social Dilemmas
The social dilemma paradigm offers two approaches to managing social uncertainty in alliances: structural and motivational (Kollock,
1998; Zeng & Chen, 2003).3 Both approaches attempt to mitigate social uncertainty by increasing trust among alliance partners, because trust
is a central critical factor determining partner
investment in alliance initiatives (McCarter &
Northcraft, 2007).
The structural approach seeks to raise alliance partner trust by making defection more
costly than cooperation (Hennart, 1988) so that
alliance partners will believe no partner has an
incentive to defect. Classic structural solutions
involve sanctions, such as threatening monetary
fines or the spread of bad reputations for defecting alliance partners (Das & Teng, 2002; Zeng &
Chen, 2003), and contracting, such as relationship-specific investments (Parkhe, 1993), credible commitments (Williamson, 1983), and selfenforcing agreements (Telser, 1980).
The motivational approach attempts to increase trust by altering how alliance partners
perceive each other (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Zaheer
& Venkatraman, 1995) so that they will believe
no partner is likely to defect, even if there appears to be an incentive to do so. Traditional
motivational solutions entail alliance partners’
communicating cooperative intent before joint
investments are made (Monge et al., 1998) and

(Kaufman & Kerr, 1993; Kollock, 1998). The co-opetition paradigm (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996) and integrative negotiation paradigm (Hoffman et al., 1999) assume that cooperation (or creating value) is independent of defection (or
claiming value): individuals acting in their own selfinterests can lead to an outcome that is in everyone’s best
interests. Thus, whereas co-opetition and integrative negotiation paradigms may be modeled using an invisible-hand
game (Miller, 1993), social dilemmas are modeled using nprisoners’ (and assurance) dilemma games (Dawes, 1980;
Liebrand, 1983).
3
Other scholarship has used alternative typologies for
grouping social dilemma solutions. For example, social psychology and operations management research codify social
dilemma solutions as a function of whether solutions are
unilateral or jointly implemented (McCarter & Northcraft,
2007; Messick & Brewer, 1983). To remain consistent with
previous research applying the social dilemma paradigm to
alliance management, we delineate solutions as to whether
they change how alliance partners perceive either the structure of the alliance or the other exchange partners in the
alliance.
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encouraging alliance partners to consider each
other’s needs (Spekman, Isabella, MacAvoy, &
Forbes, 1996). For instance, future alliance partners may meet frequently to plan, discuss goals,
and communicate intentions before contributing
resources toward alliance initiatives (Kanter,
1994; Murray & Mahon, 1993).
Limitations of Structural and
Motivational Approaches
Both structural and motivational solutions, in
isolation, are limited in their ability to encourage cooperation among alliance partners (Lichbach, 1996). Structural solutions are unable to
cover every possible free-riding loophole (Williamson, 1979), are only effective “if [they] can be
done cheaply enough” (Telser, 1980: 28), and can
negatively affect how alliance partners think
about the alliance. Regarding this last point,
contracting (for example) leads alliance partners to trust the contract rather than each other,
leaving the relationship vulnerable when the
contract is repealed or a weakness in the contract is found (Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Along these lines, Malhotra
and Lumineau’s (in press) field study on interfirm contracting shows that when disputes
arise, goodwill trust and willingness to continue
collaboration among alliance partners decrease
as the number of control provisions in the contract increase. As for sanctions, threatening
punishment not only alters the payoffs associated with cooperation and defection but also
reframes how alliance partners perceive such
behaviors. Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) found
that using sanctions to enforce cooperation diverts alliance partner attention from the moral
consequences of defection to the economic consequences of being caught defecting. This shift
of consideration actually can increase defection.
Motivational solutions alone have limitations
as well because of their reliance on verbal reassurances of alliance partner trustworthiness.
Absent action, such verbal reassurance may be
viewed as “cheap talk,” leaving partners still
suspicious of each other’s actual intent (Crawford, 1998; Farrell & Rabin, 1996). Further, alliance partners typically believe themselves to be
more honest and more cooperative (i.e., more
trustworthy) than others, which also fuels suspicion of others and, hence, defensive defection
(Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006). Indeed, re-
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search on international alliances shows that
trust is fostered only after alliance partners confirm their intentions through investment in the
alliance (Robson, Katsikeas, & Bello, 2008).
These findings highlight that neither a structural nor a motivational solution, independently, is sufficient to alleviate social uncertainty in strategic alliance social dilemmas,
suggesting the need to identify a governance
mechanism that incorporates elements of both
solutions (Foddy, Smithson, Schneider, & Hogg,
1999). Research in strategic management supports this conclusion (Agarwal et al., 2010): a
laboratory simulation of cooperation in alliances found that mutual cooperation was highest when both economic incentives were
aligned (a structural solution) and communication was allowed among alliance partners (a
motivational solution). In this article we introduce collective real options as a hybrid solution
that provides a more effective alternative than
existing alliance governance mechanisms.

REAL OPTIONS IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
A real option is a right—without an obligation—to invest resources (e.g., labor, money,
time) toward a course of action at a future point
in time (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Because of the
environmental uncertainty inherent in making
any investment (Hobfoll, 1998), real options provide an attractive “psychological hedge” in the
minds of investors (Bazerman & Gillespie, 1999;
Malhotra, 2005). Real options allow investors to
feel less vulnerable to the negative effects of
investment failure (Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer,
1996). Environmental uncertainty is mitigated
because real options delay full investment until
critical information about the environment (such
as market conditions, profitability of a potential
investment, and entry of new competitors) can
be revealed over time (Bowman & Hurry, 1993).
An example of how real options reduce environmental uncertainty is a university that is considering adoption of a new technology, such as a
campus phone system (Ziedonis, 2007). Prior to
investing large amounts of resources to roll out
the new phone system campus wide, the university can take the real option of field testing the
system in one campus building. After the field
test, environmental uncertainty is reduced because the university has additional information
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about how the phone system works, along with
the compatibility and benefits of the system.
Real options change the structure of an investment by separating resource allocation into a
multistage process, with an option to exit at the
conclusion of any stage (Adner & Levinthal,
2004; Mu, 2006). While real options take a variety
of forms (Trigeorgis, 1999), the focus here is on
“time-to-build” real options (also called
“growth” or “compound” options), in which an
individual firm’s investments come in multiple
stages (Sing, 2002; Smit & Trigeorgis, 2004). In
the first stage the firm—facing high environmental uncertainty—acquires the real option by
investing a small amount of resources, which
provides the firm an opportunity to uncover additional information about the environment so
as to make more informed later-stage investment decisions. In the later stages the firm—
having learned more about the environment—
exercises the option of either investing
additional resources or abandoning the venture.
A pilot project represents a time-to-build real
option (Ziedonis, 2007). A firm makes an initial
investment in a small version of the venture (a
pilot project) to see whether further investments
might hold promise; the firm then can exercise
the real option created by the pilot project by
making subsequent larger investments in the
venture if the results from the pilot project are
favorable (Fawcett, Magnan, & McCarter, 2008;
Kim & Sanders, 2002). In making the initial
smaller investment, the time-to-build real option
is acquired. In making the subsequent larger
investments, the time-to-build real option is exercised (Li, James, Madhaven, & Mahoney, 2007).
Collective Real Options
A collective real option is an action undertaken jointly by alliance partners when all partners agree to make a small initial investment of
resources to uncover environmental and social
information about the possible success of a subsequent larger-scale alliance initiative. Environmental information refers to factors exogenous to the alliance (such as market forces) that
influence the anticipated benefits of collective
action (such as revenues and enhanced reputation). Social information refers to factors endogenous to the alliance that influence the anticipated benefits of collective action—specifically,
the perceived trustworthiness of the alliance
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partners (Gulati, 1998), including their integrity,
reliability, and commitment. Acquiring the collective real option occurs when the alliance
partners jointly invest in the small-scale (e.g.,
pilot project) initiative. This definition highlights two key elements that separate collective
real options from traditional conceptualizations
of real options and related constructs.
First, traditional research on real options typically has examined how individuals (or individual firms) acquire real options to reduce uncertainty when making investment decisions
(Bowman & Moskowitz, 2001; Folta & Miller,
2002). However, as Li et al. (2007) suggest, real
options may be acquired and exercised by collectives, such as an alliance. Although collective real options are created by the collective
(e.g., by an alliance), later they can be exercised
independently by each member of the collective
(Pape & Schmidt-Tank, 2004)—that is, each member of the collective can decide independently
whether to fulfill or decline the subsequent
larger-scale investment. For example, the alliance partners might collectively choose to preface a large-scale alliance initiative with a pilot
project (Fawcett et al., 2008), such as developing
a new recycling process and pilot testing its
effects on a select region prior to agreeing to
jointly develop a national network of recycling
plants. The focus on joint (rather than unilateral)
implementation distinguishes collective real
options from similar concepts, such as incremental risk taking (Andriopoulos & Lowe, 2000)
and reciprocal exchange (Gouldner, 1960; Molm,
Takahashi, & Petersen, 2000). While both are
additional paths to managing social uncertainty, incremental risk taking (Dunbar, Neufeld,
Libow, Cohen, & Foley, 1997) and reciprocal exchange (Komorita, Chan, & Parks, 1993) are actions undertaken by an individual independent
of other alliance partners. The acquisition of
collective real options, in contrast, represents
coordinated action among alliance partners,4

4

Reciprocial exchange can involve negotiated exchange,
where exchange partners create an agreement that “specifies the benefits that each actor will receive from the exchange” (Molm, 2010: 122), and these benefits can flow bilaterally (Molm, 2003). Negotiated exchange is complementary
to collective real options. Resources are jointly invested into
the relationship, strengthening the level of trust among the
partners. However, what distinguishes collective real options from a negotiated-exchange strategy is the presence of
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and it is this coordinated action that provides
the opportunity to reduce social uncertainty in
the alliance.
The second difference between collective real
options and traditional real option concepts relates to the timing and benefits provided. Previous theorizing on time-to-build real options posits that their benefits are not realized until after
the pilot venture is completed and that these
benefits entail mitigating environmental uncertainty (Majd & Pindyck, 1987). However, as suggested by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Li et al.
(2007), collective real options provide social information as well as environmental information.
Social information can surface prior to the completion of the pilot venture. It is the uncovering
of information about the intentions, reliability,
and commitment of alliance partners during the
pilot project that enables collective real options
to change how alliance partners perceive each
other. For example, empirical work on technology outsourcing shows that alliance partners
jointly may make small initial investments toward alliance initiatives to uncover more information about each other’s intentions before
committing large amounts of resources to the
alliance (van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, & Duysters, 2009). This refocusing of the benefits of real
options from managing environmental uncertainty to managing social uncertainty distinguishes collective real options from similar concepts, such as contingency strategies (Nielsen,
1988) and contingent contracts (Bazerman & Gillespie, 1999), both of which are concerned with
managing environmental uncertainty (Laaksonen, Jarimo, & Kulmala, 2009).
Collective real options bridge structural and
motivational approaches to create a hybrid sosocial uncertainty (or risk of nonreciprocity; Lawler, 2001;
Molm, Collett, & Schaefer, 2007). Similar to other traditional
structural solutions (such as contracting and self-enforcing
commitments), negotiated exchange involves “agreements
that are strictly binding . . . they automatically produce the
benefits agreed upon” (Molm et al., 2007: 209), resulting in
“the risk [or perceived vulnerability] of non-reciprocity [being] eliminated” (2007: 212). Without social uncertainty, beliefs about another’s motives and intentions (i.e., trustworthiness) are difficult to form, leaving room for suspicion
when the ability to enforce agreement ends or loopholes are
discovered (Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002). Thus, the collective real option framework
complements negotiated exchange (and other structural solutions) and offers an alternative avenue for alliance partners to increase mutual cooperation.
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lution to alliance governance. As a structural
solution, collective real options change the incentives of alliance participation by lowering
the costs of cooperation (rather than by increasing the costs of defecting, as other structural
solutions do): large-scale alliance participation
is buffered by an initial less-costly (pilot project)
initiative. As a motivational solution, collective
real options reveal—through pilot project investment behaviors—alliance partners’ integrity, reliability, and commitment. By credibly
signaling intent in the pilot project, alliance
partners influence how others perceive them
through actions and not just words.
Collective Real Options and Small Wins
Using collective real options to manage social
uncertainty can best be understood as an important opportunity for a relational small win.
Small wins are “concrete, complete, implemented outcome[s] of moderate importance”
(Weick, 1984: 43), and they represent an opportunity for alliance partners to see (preview) the
potential value of successful cooperation.
The small wins framework derives from the
observation that most organizing efforts—for example, alliance initiatives—are high in complexity and uncertainty about both the intentions of others and the outcomes of mutual
cooperation (Weick, 1984). For instance, the complexity of alliance partner coordination and uncertainty about partner follow-through on promised material and intellectual contributions are
ever-present barriers to developing successful
interfirm initiatives (Wilson & Douglas, 2007).
The high complexity and uncertainty surrounding large-scale collective investment can lead
an alliance partner to be fearful about whether
the other partners will cooperate. This fear often
leads individuals to forgo cooperative initiatives—to defensively defect (Hobfoll, 1989). The
small wins framework suggests that breaking a
large-scale collective effort up into multiple
smaller collective efforts reduces the task’s complexity and perceived uncertainty (Weick, 1984).
This, in turn, lowers the barrier for alliance partners to invest resources in an initial smaller
collective effort. The smaller collective effort
then provides the opportunity to achieve small
wins.
The smaller (pilot project) collective effort, in
fact, can provide two kinds of small wins: a
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small win demonstrating the viability of the
larger-scale cooperative effort (i.e., “proof-ofconcept”; McAdam, McAdam, Galbraith, &
Miller, 2010) and a small win demonstrating the
trustworthiness of alliance partners. Exploring
the viability of a collective venture reduces environmental uncertainty, while exploring the
trustworthiness of alliance partners reduces social uncertainty. Because the success of the
small initial investment lowers the environmental and social uncertainty barriers to subsequent larger-scale alliance investments, the
achievement of these small wins propels the
exchange parties forward to invest in largerscale collective efforts (Reay, Golden-Biddle, &
Germann, 2006). Whereas traditional research
on real options focuses on achieving small wins
to mitigate environmental uncertainty, this article shifts the focus to understanding how collective real options reduce social uncertainty by
influencing the development of trust.
Relational Small Wins and Trust
Relational small wins encourage subsequent
larger-scale cooperation in alliances by fostering trust and thereby reducing social uncertainty. Trust is an individual’s “expectations, assumptions or beliefs about the likelihood that
another’s future actions will be beneficial, favorable or at least not detrimental” to the individual (Robinson, 1996: 576), and it is formed
through social interaction. When individuals interact, they bring with them values about what
behaviors are appropriate in a relationship,
along with expectations about behaviors they
want from others, and they experience emotions
based on how other individuals treat them
(Jones & George, 1998). Through social interaction each individual attempts to (1) assess the
perceived values of the other (“Does the individual have integrity?”), (2) know whether others
have met his or her expectations (“Did they cooperate or not?”), and (3) use his or her current
emotions and moods as indicators to assess the
quality of the relationships (“How do I feel
based on how others treated me?”).
Research on trust in alliances references the
real options research literature as holding
promise in understanding how alliance partners
build trust (Das & Teng, 1998). Trust evolves
through interaction among individuals when
values are perceived as congruent, positive ex-
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pectations are met, and positive emotions and
moods are experienced based on how an individual has been treated by others (Jones &
George, 1998). Applying this logic to strategic
alliances, collective real options enable alliance partners to uncover information about the
reliability, integrity, and commitment of one another. When the relational small wins are realized, alliance partners know that everyone else
is reliable and committed to alliance success.
As a consequence, the alliance partners become
more trusting of one another.
Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies (1998) suggest
that trust should develop among alliance partners as a function of the nature of their experience in acquiring the collective real option. How
the alliance experience, when acquiring a collective real option, influences future cooperation
can best be seen through the lens of vulnerability.

Trust and Perceived Vulnerability
Vulnerability has been defined variously as
an individual’s biased assessment of a risky
situation (Cho & Lee, 2006), composed of the degree of variability in the outcome of the purchase (or investment; Cox, 1967) and the amount
of resources that can be lost (Cunningham,
1967); as an individual’s assessed probability of
an investment’s success and the confidence in
that assessment (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Sitkin &
Weingart, 1995); and as a function of the social
environment and the extent to which an individual believes his or her resources are in danger
of being exploited by others (Meyerson et al.,
1996). The recurring theme in these conceptualizations is that vulnerability is an individual’s
perception of risk subject to situational and social influences. Here we define perceived vulnerability as an individual’s assessment of uncertainty about the future behavior of others
and/or the environment.
Exposure is the amount an individual alliance
partner must risk losing (in proportion to that
partner’s total wealth) to achieve the benefits
from the investment (Cho & Lee, 2006; Cunningham, 1967). For example, an alliance partner
risking 90 percent of its total wealth toward the
collective effort experiences relatively high exposure, while an alliance partner risking 10 percent of its total wealth toward the collective
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effort experiences relatively low exposure (Lubell, 2004). Thus, whereas perceived vulnerability is about the probability of failure of mutual
cooperation in an alliance, exposure is concerned with how badly an alliance partner will
be damaged if such a failure occurs. Exposure
may be central to understanding how collective
real options can impact trust formation even
when mutual cooperation occurs in its acquisition.
In summary, collective real options enable alliance partners to find out more information
about the social and task environments before
undertaking full investment in an alliance.
When mutual cooperation is successful in the
acquisition of the collective real option, the alliance partners experience a relational small
win. The achievement of a relational small win
reduces the uncertainty inherent in how an alliance partner perceives its vulnerability in the
alliance.

MODELING REAL OPTIONS EFFECTS
First we try, then we trust! (Sean Connery in the
film Entrapment).

As suggested by the above quotation, collective real options enable alliance partners to
“first try” to see if they can trust one another,
prior to making full investments in the alliance.
In this section we articulate a series of propositions modeling how collective real options influence trust formation in alliance relationships
and, as a consequence, subsequent large-scale
alliance investment. Propositions 1 through 3
constitute the base model. Successful mutual
cooperation when the alliance acquires the real
option provides a relational small win, thereby
increasing trust among the alliance partners.
The increase in trust among the alliance partners reduces the perceived vulnerability from
social uncertainty, so (as a consequence) alliance partners should be more willing to cooperate by fully investing in the alliance. Propositions 4 through 7 extend the core model by
considering how characteristics of the collective
real option (i.e., exposure) and the alliance partners (i.e., reputation) influence trust formation.
Figure 1 provides a conceptual roadmap outlining these relationships.
Two boundary conditions are necessary to understand the impact of collective real options
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FIGURE 1
A Conceptual Model of a Collective Real Options Approach to the
Social Dilemma of Strategic Alliances

and the relational small wins they can produce.
First, the attainment of a small win requires the
external environment both to be promising and
to provide the alliance partners a favorable return on the real option (assuming mutual cooperation occurs). Otherwise, the firms have an
incentive to exit the venture by not exercising
the option of further investment (Adner &
Levinthal, 2004). This first assumption stems
from recent social dilemma research showing
that social uncertainty and environmental influence are distinct determinants of alliance cooperation: individuals will defect in the presence
of environmental uncertainty irrespective of
how much they trust their alliance partners (McCarter et al., 2010).
Second, our model is based on the psychological approach to trust (see Lewicki, Tomlinson, &
Gillespie, 2006, for a review), which assumes
that trust among individuals begins low (at the
conceptual level of zero) and the first encounter
among individuals acts as a validation opportunity regarding trustworthiness (Jones & George,
1998). If the encounter is positive, then trust increases as a function of the amount of the risk
embedded in the encounter. The psychological
approach also assumes that trust is not monolithic across the breadth of the relationship
among alliance partners. Lewicki and colleagues (1998) observed that relationships are
complex and multifaceted. Thus, existing relationships may be composed of individuals who

trust each other on some matters but not others.
As suggested by Hardin (1993), individual A can
trust individual B to do action X but not action Y,
because either action Y is different from action X
or because previous experience has shown that
individual B cannot (for whatever reason) do
action Y. This insight is illustrated in Larson’s
(1992) case study of the formation of interfirm
ties: although some alliance partners had considerable positive history with each other outside the alliance context, they nevertheless undertook a “trial phase” to prove each other’s
trustworthiness related to alliance activities.
Drawing from this approach, our theorizing posits that, in relation to elements specific to the
strategic alliance, prospective alliance partners
begin with low trust. This assumption does not
remove the possibility that the alliance partners
share a positive history outside the alliance (as
will be discussed later); it leaves room for the
alliance partners to enlarge the breadth of their
relationship through small wins germane to alliance initiatives.
Relational Small Wins of Mutual Cooperation
and Trust
Successful mutual cooperation increases trust
among alliance partners. When alliance partners invest in the small-scale alliance initiative,
they acquire an opportunity to experience successful mutual cooperation in the form of a col-
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lective real option. Significantly, acquiring a
collective real option is not necessarily a onetime event. Agreeing to invest in an initial
small-scale project must be followed up with
fulfillment of promised capital, personnel, and
commitment throughout the time period of the
pilot project (Robson et al., 2008).
The real options research literature holds
promise for understanding how “incremental resource commitments” could increase trust
among alliance partners (Das & Teng, 1998: 504).
An alliance’s successful mutual cooperation in
acquiring a collective real option creates an exchange history among the alliance partners
(Gulati, 1995a). This exchange history entails alliance partners’ uncovering one another’s values, expectations, and feelings about each other
(such as integrity, reliability, and commitment
to the alliance)—all of which influence the formation of trust (Jones & George, 1998; Poppo,
Zhou, & Sungmin, 2008). As a result, the “predictability” of alliance partners’ future behavior increases (Weick, 1984) and trust (as a consequence) is enhanced (Sniezek, May, & Sawyer,
1990; Vangen & Huxham, 2003):
Proposition 1: Alliances that experience the relational small wins of mutual cooperation by successfully acquiring collective real options will
experience higher trust compared to
alliances that do not experience relational small wins of mutual cooperation by successfully acquiring collective real options.

Trust and Perceived Vulnerability
Trust is a critical psychological factor in determining the level of perceived vulnerability
that an exchange partner experiences in an alliance. When trust is high, social uncertainty
about the future behavior of others is minimized
(Kollock, 1994). A decrease in social uncertainty
makes alliance partners less fearful that their
investment will be lost because of free riding or
defensive defection (Schnake, 1991; Sniezek et
al., 1990). Perceived vulnerability is therefore reduced among alliance partners. Trust will mediate the relationship between relational small
wins of mutual cooperation in acquiring the collective real option and perceived vulnerability.
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Proposition 2a: As trust among alliance partners increases, perceived
vulnerability experienced by those alliance partners decreases.
Proposition 2b: Trust mediates the relationship between relational small
wins and perceived vulnerability of
alliance partners.

Vulnerability and Investment in
Strategic Alliances
Perceived vulnerability negatively affects an
alliance partner’s willingness to contribute resources toward the alliance. In social dilemmas
an individual experiences high perceived vulnerability from uncertainty (about others or the
value of cooperation) and the fact that resources
must be risked. Resource conservation theories
maintain that when individuals perceive that
their resources are threatened with a potentially
irreversible loss, they experience stress and
therefore seek to avoid the threat by selecting a
course of action that minimizes the likelihood
their resources will be lost (Hobfoll, 1998). Consumer purchasing theories make a similar prediction about individuals facing risky investments: high perceived risk (vulnerability) in an
investment motivates individuals to engage in
“risk reduction strategies”— one of which is
avoiding the investment (Cox, 1967). In social
dilemma terms, risk reduction likely equates to
defecting (or undercontributing) toward the alliance public good.
Proposition 3: An alliance partner will
be less likely to contribute toward the
alliance’s initiatives when perceived
vulnerability is higher.

Exposure and Trust Development
Recent research on trust development in alliances suggests that it is not the length of the
history among alliance partners that develops
trust but, rather, the quality of that history (Gulati & Sytch, 2008; Lewicki et al., 2006). Exposure
when acquiring the collective real option may
have a direct effect on whether a relational
small win is achieved and what impact that
relational small win has on trust development
among alliance partners.
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High exposure in creating the collective real
option may legislate against ever attempting a
relational small win. Recent work on real options and organizational learning maintains
that if trial-and-error learning (e.g., via a pilot
project) is too risky (i.e., exposure is high), firms
will be reluctant to invest in pilot projects (Fichman, 2004). Similarly, if acquiring a collective
real option requires high levels of exposure, alliance partners may be particularly likely to experience higher vulnerability from social uncertainty (Cho & Lee, 2006; Hobfoll, 1998).
Experiencing heightened perceived vulnerability, alliance partners will be inclined to underinvest (or not invest at all) in the acquisition of
the collective real option. As a consequence of
this underinvestment, the opportunity for
achieving the relational small win of mutual
cooperation is less likely. The unsuccessful
achievement of a relational small win when acquiring the collective real option will keep trust
low among alliance partners. Trust will be low
because the unsuccessful achievement of mutual cooperation will create a trust breach, decreasing an alliance partner’s trust in the other
partners’ intentions to support the alliance
(Lount, Zhong, Sivanathan, & Murnighan, 2008;
Stout, 2008).
Considering the potential negative outcome
of high exposure, an initial strategy to elicit
cooperation among alliance partners may be to
ask for small investments (minimizing exposure)
when acquiring the collective real option. However, low exposure when acquiring the collective real option may undermine the development of trust, even when the relational small
win of mutual cooperation is realized in acquiring the collective real option. Molm et al. note
that “both structural risk and trustworthy behaviors are necessary for the development of trust”
(2007: 212). Indeed, extant trust research proposes that without “enough vulnerability”
among exchange parties, trust cannot successfully form (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995;
Ribstein, 2000). Empirical research on the “footin-the-door” technique supports this claim: getting individuals to make a small initial investment increases the likelihood they will comply
with larger requests in the future, and future
compliance increases when the initial request is
moderate rather than low (Segilman, Bush, &
Kirsch, 1976). An explanation for this moderating
effect of exposure on the relationship between
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relational small wins and trust can be found in
attribution theory, which suggests that causal
attributions for an individual’s compliance to a
request are a function of the request’s perceived
difficulty (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973). When alliance partners invest small amounts of resources
toward the acquisition of a collective real option, that cooperation is more likely to be attributed to the low exposure of the request rather
than to the commitment (or trustworthiness) of
the alliance partners (Malhotra & Murnighan,
2002).
Empirical results from experimental social
psychology support this explanation of trust development. In the “trust game” Pillutla, Malhotra, and Murnighan (2003) found that large offers
from the sender are attributed by receivers as
signals of high trust while low offers are not. In
other words, the extent to which an alliance
partner risks exposure influences how committed to the alliance (and, thus, trustworthy) that
alliance partner is perceived to be.
Proposition 4a: As exposure in acquiring the collective real option decreases, the likelihood of investment
by alliance partners to realize a relational small win of mutual cooperation increases.
Proposition 4b: Exposure in acquiring
the collective real option will moderate the relationship between relational small wins and trust such that
relational small wins of mutual cooperation will have a less beneficial effect on trust among alliance partners
when exposure is low than when exposure is high.
Partner Reputation and Trust Development
The previous section considered how a characteristic of the collective real option— exposure
required of alliance partners—influences an alliance partner’s cooperation, when acquiring
the collective real option, and trust formation. A
characteristic of the alliance partners themselves—reputation—also may impact both collective real option acquisition and its effects on
trust development. Reputation refers to information about how an alliance partner performed
previously in separate ventures (Shane & Cable,
2002). Reputational information is a powerful so-
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cial-structural element of alliance relationships
(Gulati, 1995b) and can be acquired either firsthand, through direct social encounters (Anderson & Shirako, 2008), or secondhand, through
social networks (Kogut, Shan, & Walker, 1992).
Reputation should directly influence cooperation in alliance initiatives because it provides
alliance partners with information about one
another’s values, expectations, and feelings
(Jones & George, 1998) and thereby signals alliance partners about the predictability of each
other’s future behavior (Bolton, Katok, & Ockenfels, 2005; Kollock, 1994), thus reducing social uncertainty. Individuals who perceive one
another as having a positive (cooperative) reputation are more likely to cooperate in situations requiring trust (Weber, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2005). Bohnet and Huck (2004) found
that allowing participants to know their current partners’ history of cooperation with previous partners (and that the history was positive) increased their willingness to initially
cooperate. This empirical finding suggests
that other partners’ reputations should influence an alliance partner’s willingness to acquire a collective real option.
Proposition 5: The positive reputations
of other alliance partners increase the
likelihood of investment by alliance
partners to realize a relational small
win of mutual cooperation.
Reputation may also indirectly influence trust
formation, when attempting relational small
wins, by buffering the impact of real option success or failure on subsequent trust development
and alliance partner investments in alliance activities. Kelley and Michela’s (1980) review of
attribution theory is one of the first to suggest
that an individual’s reputation can influence
how others attribute the cause of the individual’s current behavior. Alliance partners may be
buffered (positively or negatively) by their reputations, which may impact how they are perceived after small wins are attempted (Jones,
Jones, & Little, 2000). Similar to our discussion
about the moderating effect of exposure, collective members often seek causal explanations for
the outcomes of their collective efforts (Stouten,
De Cremer, & van Dijk, 2006; Weber, Camerer,
Rottenstreich, & Knez, 2001). If reputation among
alliance partners is positive (from a previous
history of cooperative behavior), then successful
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achievement of relational small wins will more
likely be treated as confirmation of the reliability and trustworthiness of the alliance partners.
This should enhance trust more than if partners
initially have little or no reputational information to draw on.
Proposition 6: Achieving relational
small wins will have more of an effect
on trust among alliance partners when
reputations are positive than when
there is no reputation information.
What happens when alliance partners fail to
achieve mutual cooperation? Alliance partner
reputation may act as a buffer between collective failure and potential distrust among alliance partners. If an alliance partner has a positive reputation (history of being cooperative),
defection would likely be attributed to an external cause, such as the riskiness or difficulty of
cooperating, and the defecting alliance partner
would less likely be viewed as untrustworthy by
the other partner(s). In support of this position,
Lount et al. (2008) found that participants in an
iterated prisoner’s dilemma who experienced
partner defection after a history of partner cooperation were more willing to continue to trust
their partner, suggesting they attributed that defection to something external.
Proposition 7: Failure to achieve small
wins will have less of an effect on trust
among alliance partners when reputations are positive than when there is
no reputation information.
In summary, a collective real option creates
the opportunity for alliances to achieve relational small wins of mutual cooperation. These
relational small wins build trust, and high trust
increases an alliance partner’s willingness to
contribute toward the alliance by lowering that
partner’s perceived vulnerability. Exposure,
when acquiring the collective real option, directly affects the likelihood of mutual cooperation and also, when a small win is achieved,
moderates the relationship between mutual cooperation and the development of trust among
alliance partners. Reputation of the alliance
partners directly affects the likelihood of mutual
cooperation and also moderates the relationship between mutual cooperation success or
failure and the development of trust among alliance partners.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Past research on real options has focused primarily on individual strategies for mitigating
environmental uncertainty. Here we draw from
the small wins literature and social dilemma
literature to introduce the concept of collective
real options, and we explore how collective real
options may impact the management of social
uncertainty in strategic alliance social dilemmas.

Theoretical Implications
A real options approach to navigating strategic alliance social dilemmas provides an understanding of how an alliance may be structured
to manage not only how exchange partners
think about the alliance but also how they think
about each other (Kollock, 1998; Zeng & Chen,
2003). Collective real options enable alliance
partners to hedge risk from the market environment and to hedge risk from the social environment by allowing them to “first try, then trust”
each other on larger alliance initiatives. In trying, alliance partners credibly reveal their cooperative intentions through actions (i.e., investing
in the collective real option), and these actions
affect how other alliance partners perceive
them.
Using collective real options to “test the waters” of cooperating with alliance partners may
be particularly useful in cases where intangible
contributions will have a lot to say in determining whether the alliance succeeds or fails. Related governance approaches, such as negotiated exchange (e.g., Molm, 2010), may be good at
creating enforcement mechanisms for concrete
alliance contributions that can be monitored
and confirmed, but it is difficult to legislate trying hard and thinking hard. As suggested by
Sesil, when it is “difficult to monitor effort,” a
mechanism that signals cooperative intent is
helpful to increase trust and cooperation among
alliance partners (2006: 593). For such resources—and particularly when those resources will
partly determine whether an alliance succeeds—alliance partners may need the proof of
a relational small win to feel comfortable going
the distance with other alliance partners.
Collective real options may also prove particularly useful in revealing whether all alliance
partners are on the same page in terms of what
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it means to fulfill one’s obligations to the alliance. Tenbrunsel and Northcraft (2010) note that
not all defection in alliances need be intentional. Any partner brings to an alliance idiosyncratic views of what it means to be a “good
partner” and may be fulfilling its own views
even while not fulfilling what other alliance
partners think is fair. Furthermore, although a
“logic of appropriateness” typically governs social exchanges (e.g., March, 1994; McCarter, Budescu, & Scheffran, 2011), which logic of appropriateness applies in a particular situation may
differ among partners, depending on how they
frame the alliance activity (e.g., as investing
versus cooperating). For these reasons talk not
only may be cheap but may also insufficiently
reveal what is in the minds of alliance partners.
Happily, collective real options may provide
both an opportunity to reveal differences of
opinion and perspective along these lines and a
forum for reconciling those differences to form a
more perfect union during any later, larger collaboration.
Given these concerns, it should not be surprising that alliance research has discovered a period of “ambivalence” existing among partners
in the early stages of an alliance (Gulati &
Sytch, 2008). This period of ambivalence may
well reflect a tension within alliance partners to
approach the value creation opportunities alliances promise but to avoid the vulnerability
that alliance cooperation inevitability entails.
The attribution perspective on exposure and
trust development explored here suggests that
erring on the side of too much caution— by
avoiding any vulnerability in early-stage alliance initiatives—may doom an alliance to never
develop enough trust. Alliances that use collective real options as a means to develop trust,
therefore, must search out the happy medium
whereby alliance partners are exposed enough
to experience the development of trust, but not
so much as to discourage investment in the collective real option. Because collective real options reveal the true character of alliance partners, the very willingness of partners to acquire
a collective real option—and thus risk revealing
their character—suggests something about their
intent to cooperate. This is not to suggest that a
partner could not fake collaborative posture during a pilot venture with the intention of behaving more opportunistically later. However, the
larger the exposure an alliance partner has in
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the pilot venture, perhaps the more likely that
partner’s true character will be revealed.
Our analysis of the impact of collective real
options also offers a new perspective on the role
of reputations in alliances. Previous research on
trust and cooperation has highlighted the main
effects of reputations on trust (Bohnet & Huck,
2004; Das & Teng, 2001; Weber et al., 2005). Our
arguments shift the focus of reputations to their
indirect effects on partners’ interpretations of
success and failure of pilot ventures. Specifically, a positive reputation may serve to enhance the impact of cooperative behaviors on
trust development when relational small wins
are achieved, and it may buffer an alliance partner from being viewed as untrustworthy when
small wins are not achieved. Significantly, any
discussion of reputations in alliances begs
some interesting levels-of-analysis issues, such
as whether alliances can trust, or whether trust
is really the province of individual decision
makers. This becomes particularly important
when we contemplate the possibility that reputation within a multiple-actor partner may not
be homogeneous or that any partner’s reputation may not be homogeneously perceived
within an alliance, or even within other partners
(Arend, 2009). Although beyond the scope of this
article, such questions bring numbers into the
discussion— both the number of partners in the
alliance and the number of actors within any
“partner”—since trust becomes a harder nut to
crack as group size increases (e.g., Huck & Lunser, 2010), probably on both dimensions.
Another critical contribution of this article is
that it redirects scholarly conversation about alliance governance, from managing opportunism
to managing defensive perceptions. Previous research, such as game-theoretic and transaction
cost approaches to alliance management, has
emphasized governing alliances to avoid offensive (opportunistic) defection (Heide & Miner,
1992; Parkhe, 1993). Recent research on applying
the social dilemma paradigm to alliances has
echoed this emphasis by focusing on structural
and motivational strategies that help protect
“an overtrusting partner [from being an] easy
target for exploitation by its greedy partners”
(Zeng & Chen, 2003: 588). This does not suggest
that research on alliance social dilemmas ignores defensive defection. Indeed, Zeng and
Chen (2003) encouraged trust building as a
means of alleviating fear of opportunism. How-
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ever, McCarter and Northcraft (2007) suggest
that even if an alliance is structured to remove
offensive defection, such as by making all partners irreplaceable, an alliance partner may still
doubt others’ ability and willingness to cooperate and defect defensively. This insight reminds
us that alliance management is not only about
reducing opportunism but also about a partner
reducing other partners’ fear they will be made
the “sucker” (Schnake, 1991). Whereas recent alliance research considers perceptions when examining alliance governance (McCarter &
Northcraft, 2007), our model extends this thinking by using real options to show one way to
manage defensive perceptions among alliance
partners. Rather than avoiding opportunism by
others, the emphasis of this approach is avoiding missed opportunities to create value by lowering the barriers to collective cooperation.
Solutions to managing social uncertainty
might be applicable to strategic alliances where
offensive defection is either possible or not. Our
model applies to both cases. If the alliance is
structured to allow free riding, collective real
options enable familiarity among alliance partners and the achievement of shared benefits,
thereby reducing the temptation to opportunistically hurt others and potentially kill the golden
goose (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). If an alliance
structure makes free riding impossible, then collective real options enable alliance partners to
garner trust and show both the motivation and
the capability to cooperate as the stakes grow
(Chen, 1996).
This article also provides several contributions to the study of real options. First, previous
research has examined how real options manage external market environments and mitigate
environmental uncertainty to encourage alliance success (Kogut, 1991). Here we show how
real options can manage and reduce social uncertainty among alliance partners, thereby answering the call from scholars to understand
how real options affect the social, as well as the
exogenous, environment (Busby & Pitts, 1997;
Foote & Folta, 2002). In acquiring the collective
real option, alliance partners may uncover each
other’s intentions before significant investments
are made. This insight redirects discussion of
real options from managing the external market
environment to navigating the internal social
environment.
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Second, the real options literature has primarily examined how firms individually use real
options in investments (Li et al., 2007). However,
we emphasize that collective real options may
be used strategically in collective efforts: alliance partners can jointly acquire a collective
real option (such as undertaking a pilot project)
while retaining the unilateral ability to exit
should the future look relationally (or environmentally) grim. Indeed, collective real options
can increase trust and foster cooperation by decreasing perceived vulnerability among alliance partners, and thus lowering the barrier to
at least try to cooperate.
A third contribution to the real options literature is challenging the premise that time-tobuild real option benefits cannot be realized
until after all stages of investment have been
made and that these benefits are either financial or physical in nature (Majd & Pindyck, 1987).
This assumption may hold if the benefits of real
options are only monetary (Trigeorgis, 1999).
However, our model considers the relational
benefits (e.g., information about other alliance
partners’ cooperative intent)—in addition to the
economic benefits (e.g., monetary returns from
the pilot project)—that become available before
full investment is required. Considering that
with whom we invest can be just as important as
in what we invest (Adabor, 2006), the relational
benefits of collective real options should provide decision makers invaluable information
that influences both their social and investment
behavior.
This article advances the idea of small wins
as well. While Weick’s (1984) seminal framework provides explanations for how largescale alliance initiatives are achieved (Reay
et al., 2006), it gives little consideration to how
the size of the small win makes a difference in
motivating cooperation. Weick acknowledges
that wins can be “arranged on a continuum”
(1984: 43) in different orders of magnitude. We
expand on this observation, explaining how
and why the size of the small win matters. If
the small win is too small, then alliance partners may not be convinced that future cooperation will result in large-scale benefits; if too
large a small win is attempted, vulnerability
may discourage prospective alliance partners
from ever pursuing it.
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Managerial Implications
This article also provides several implications
for managers. Primarily, collective real options
offer alternatives for alliance governance. Consider, for example, the often proposed remedy to
reduce social uncertainty in alliance efforts: external regulation (e.g., government regulation).
While external regulators can increase cooperation (Olson, 1965), they also can introduce additional conflicts of interest and ulterior motives
among collective partners that undermine the
very cooperation these regulations were meant
to create (Crowe, 1969; Tenbrunsel & Messick,
1999). A collective real options approach may be
particularly attractive to collectives for addressing social dilemmas because it retains control
within the group and is self-perpetuating
through small wins, while still avoiding the
risks of unilateral cooperation.
An example of an alliance seeking to avoid
third-party intervention through the use of collective real options is the Suwannee River Partnership in northern Florida, formed to encourage Florida farmers to voluntarily cooperate to
reduce water pollution and avoid government
intervention. These farmers faced a social dilemma since each farmer was tempted to defect
by letting other neighboring farmers incur the
costs of mitigating water pollution— but if everyone chose this strategy, water pollution
would continue and government sanctions
would be imposed. To encourage cooperation
among the hesitant farmers, the partnership organized joint small-scale demonstration projects to build trust among the farmers so that
everyone would cooperate on a larger scale—
that is, adopting best practices that would cost
an individual farm hundreds of thousands of
dollars to implement (Dedekorkut, 2005). The
successful utilization of collective real options
among the farmers meant farms and local organizations retained control.
A second managerial implication concerns
what management scholars transfer to management practice (Van de Ven, 2007). For decades
the discussion in business periodicals has been
primarily about leveraging real options to reduce environmental uncertainty (Copeland &
Tufano, 2004; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994). While
informative for managers, this myopic focus has
been unfortunate, considering that social uncertainty is, perhaps, the most commonly discussed
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hazard to effective collective action (Olson, 2002;
Williamson, 1991). This article suggests that not
all small wins are created equal. Rather, the
larger the small win, the greater the likelihood
that individuals will push forward to achieve
something greater. However, large small wins
can only be achieved at the risk of higher levels
of exposure, making alliance partners less
likely to cooperate and more likely to suspect
that their partners will not fully cooperate either. In short, there is an optimal mid range of
risk that alliances must find to have enough
exposure to garner trust but not too much to
scare away prospective alliance partners.
Future Directions
The model and propositions offered here provide several avenues for future research. This
article addresses how collective real options influence trust and cooperation in strategic alliance initiatives. An unaddressed issue that remains is what role alliance size (number of
alliance partners) plays in the dynamics described in this model. When collective action
entails a large number of partners (often beyond
two parties), unilateral strategies, such as direct
reciprocal exchange and sanctioning, become
difficult to implement because of increased
monitoring costs and complexity (Boyd & Richerson, 1988; Carpenter, 2007; Molm, 1994). Using
collective real options, in contrast, requires coordinated actions that allow partners to exit the
alliance should large-scale collective action
look grim. This contrast suggests that as the
number of alliance partners increases, so
should the likelihood of adopting a collective
real options strategy.
Understanding the effects of collective real
options internal to the alliance raises the question, “What effects do collective real options
have on external alliance relationships?” Our
model focuses on outcomes directly related to
the achievement of small wins and does not
consider the potential indirect effects of (not)
achieving a small win. This narrower focus may
initially suggest that using a collective real option is always the best approach in alliances,
but this actually may not always be the case.
For instance, what we experience in one instance can spill over into other similar instances
(Byrne & Clore, 1970; Messick, 1999). If an alliance partner experiences a breach in trust with
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a set of partners using a collective real option,
then that partner may carry that fear into other
relationships with the same— or completely different—alliance partners. Future research may
consider whether trust breaches and successful
trust building using collective real options carry
over to other related cooperative ventures and
how long these carryover effects persist.
A third issue concerns how real options may
be used to signal participants and outside observers of alliances. Research has long focused
on the role of signaling for fostering cooperation
(Kollock, 1998). Signaling is important in cooperative efforts (especially where verbal communication is not possible) because it reduces other
individuals’ social uncertainty and breeds trust.
While suggesting how collective real options
can be a signaling mechanism, the current
model is limited in terms of who is being signaled. The model focuses only on those directly
involved in the social dilemma being signaled
about the intentions of their alliance partners.
Research on social movements (a form of alliance) reminds us that the composition of collectives facing social uncertainty is not static: newcomers often are solicited to join the cause or
hold out until they become assured that largescale cooperation is possible (Whittier, 1997;
Zald & McCarthy, 1987). In future research scholars may wish to examine how using real options
can serve as a mechanism for signaling and
facilitating cooperation among active participators and outside observers who are considering
joining the cause.
It has been said that “what we accomplish
together will benefit many” (Stewart, 2001: 1),
and in many ways the fruits of collaboration are
what separate the civilized from the savages.
Unfortunately, the benefits of working together
can be elusive, because alliances create social
dilemmas in which individuals withhold cooperation when they perceive themselves as potentially vulnerable to others’ opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1991), and there is rarely a
“Leviathan” (Hobbes, 1907/1651) handy to enforce
cooperative intent. Drawing from the social dilemma, real options, and small wins literature,
this article presents a hybrid approach to mitigating social uncertainty in alliance governance. Collective real options provide alliance
partners the opportunity to first try and then
trust each other before undertaking large-scale
(and thus large-exposure) cooperative initia-
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tives. Using a collective real options approach
enables us to explain and predict how an appropriately sized small win is the first step in completing the long journey toward having alliance
partners successfully working together.
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